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I. INTRODUCTION
Two principles of water law which have been developing side-by-side
in several western states over the years collided in National Audubon
Society v. The Superior Court of Alpine County' (hereinafter referred to
as Mono Lake). The California Supreme Court was faced with determin-
ing the relative legal positions of the state's appropriative water rights
system2 and the public trust doctrine,3 which the court has recognized and
expanded during the past century. The setting could not have been more
dramatic. Mono Lake is a large beautiful lake at the base of the Sierra
Nevada Range with unique ecological, geological and aesthetic values.
Under the state's appropriation system, which evolved to encourage and
insure the orderly distribution of water to sites distant from the source, Los
Angeles was allowed to divert and transport water from Mono Basin over
two hundred miles to the city even though the diversion significantly
altered Mono Lake. To protect the lake and its ecological and recreational
characteristics, the National Audubon Society sought an injunction to halt
the increased diversion out of Mono Basin on the basis of the public trust
doctrine. Despite each side's argument that one principle of water law
should prevail, the court held that both principles were vital and by
necessity must coexist to provide a balanced approach to water use.
Although far reaching, the scope of the Mono Lake decision was
limited by the California court's insistence on associating public trust
protection with navigability. By contrast, Montana, also a state with an
appropriative water rights system, recently abandoned the navigability
test in applying the doctrine. In Montana Coalition for Stream Access v.
Curran,4 the Montana Supreme Court relied on both the public trust
1. 33 Cal. 3d 419,658 P.2d 709,189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 104S. Ct. 413 (1983). Thecase
has popularly been referred to as the Mono Lake case.
2. The appropriation system can be viewed as the western counterpart to the eastern states'
riparian system. In many western states it has become the only means of acquiring a water right. The
appropriator must use the water for a beneficial purpose. Conflicting claims are decided on the basis of
"first in time, first in right."
3. The public trust doctrine requires government to act as a fiduciary or "public guardian(s) of
those valuable natural resources which are not capable of self-regeneration and for which substitutes
cannot be made by man." Cohen, The Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine and the Environment,
1970 UTAH L. REV. 388 (1970). The doctrine was first applied to navigable waters, but is now being
applied to other uses.
4. Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran,-. Mont._ ._, 682 P.2d 163, 170
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doctrine and the water rights provisions of the Montana Constitution to
hold that the public's use of water for recreational purposes should be
limited only by the characteristics of the water.
California and Montana have signaled paths that the courts in other
western states should follow as they seek to resolve competitive claims for
the use of this region's lifeblood-water.
II. FACTS
The California Supreme Court described Mono Lake as a "scenic and
ecological treasure of national significance."5 It is the second largest lake
wholly in California and is located near Yosemite Park.6 The major source
of water for the lake comes from five streams carrying snow melt from the
Sierra Nevada Mountains.' The lake has no natural outlet and the water is
not potable because of the high saline content.8 The salinity, however,
makes the lake suitable for a brine shrimp population, which at least until
recently was thriving. The shrimp serve as an important food source for a
number of migratory birds which the lake hosts and a breeding colony of
California gulls which inhabit islands in the lake.9
Over forty years ago, with an eye toward procuring water for the
projected future needs of Los Angeles, the Department of Water and
Power of the City of Los Angeles (hereinafter DWP), purchased the
riparian rights for four of the five streams supplying Mono Lake as well as
the riparian rights of Mono Lake itself.' Claiming that the water from
those sources was necessary for domestic use in Los Angeles, DWP applied
to the Division of Water Resources (the predecessor to the California
Water Resources Board, hereinafter Board) for the appropriative rights
(1984). See also, Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, - Mont. -_, 684 P.2d 1088
(1984).
5. Mono Lake, 33 Cal. 3d at 425, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
6. The court notes in the opinion that prior to any diversion from the Mono Basin the lake's area
was 85 square miles. By 1979 the area had been reduced to 60.3 square miles. DWP projects that the
lake will stabilize with an area of 38 square miles, some 56% smaller than the pre-diversion lake.
Plaintiffs dispute DWP's projections and contend that the lake's size will be decreased even more and
that the lake may even go dry. Id. at 429, 658 P.2d at 714-715, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 351-352.
7. The five freshwater streams which supply Mono Lake are Mill, Lee Vining, Walker, Parker
and Rush Creeks. DWP has the riparian and appropriate rights to all but Mill Creek. Id. at 424,427,
658 P.2d at 711, 713, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348, 350.
8. Water is lost from Mono Lake only by evaporation and seepage as there is no natural outlet.
As the water evaporates natural salts are left behind and give the lake its saline nature. Id. at 429, 658
P.2d at 715, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
9. Among the birds which stop at Mono Lake on migration routes are the Northern Phalarope,
Wilson's Phalarope, and the Eared Grebe. About a quarter of the total world population of California
Gulls nest on islands in Mono Lake. Id., 33 Cal. 3d at 424,430, 658 P.2d at 711, 716, 189 Cal. Rptr. at
348, 352.
10. Id. at 427, 658 P.2d at 713, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
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from those sources.1 ' The statutory authority governing the Board's
actions contained an inherent conflict: while the Board was empowered to
reject applications for appropriation which were not in the public interest,
the domestic use of water was declared to be the highest use of water.' 2 On
that basis and despite testimony of harm to the public interest, the Board in
1940 granted the appropriative rights to DWP.' z Within a year water from
the Mono Basin was transported to Los Angeles by its aqueduct system.14
For thirty years Los Angeles diverted about 60,000 acre feet of water
per year, which caused the lake's surface level to recede at the rate of about
one foot per year.' 5 In an effort to meet the city's ever increasing water
needs, Los Angeles constructed another aqueduct for the purpose of
increasing the flow from the Mono Basin. The amount of water diverted
from the Mono Basin after completion of the second aqueduct between
1970 and 1980 was almost double what it had been.' 6
The effect of this new diversion has been dramatic. The lake's salinity
has drastically increased.' As the salinity increases the brine shrimp
population will diminish.' 8 A decrease in the shrimp population will in turn
have an effect on the lake's resting and migratory bird populations. High
saline conditions damage these birds by affecting their osmotic equilib-
rium.'9 The bird populations are also threatened by the recession of the
lake level. The lower lake level has caused some of the islands to become
connected with the shore, thus exposing the nesting birds to predators such
as the coyote.20
To halt these problems and to prevent further destruction to the
character of Mono Lake, the National Audubon Society brought an action
I. Id.
12. "The board's primary authority to reject that application lay in a 1921 amendment to the
Water Commission Act of 1913, which authorized the board to reject an application 'when in its
judgment the proposed appropriation would not best conserve the public interest.' (Stats. 1921, ch. 329,
§ 1, p. 443, now codified as Wat. Code, § 1255.) The 1921 enactment, however, also 'declared to be the
established policy of this state that the use of water for domestic purposes is the highest use of water.'"
Id.
13. Id. at 427, 658 P.2d at 713-714, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
14. Id. at 428, 658 P.2d at 714, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
15. Id.
16. Since completion of the second aqueduct in 1970, Los Angeles has diverted nearly 100,000
acre feet per year. Mono Lake, 33 Cal. 3d at 428-429, 658 P.2d at 714, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
17. Without the supply of fresh water from the creeks diverted by DWP, the lake's natural
salinity is no longer balanced, and the salinity of the water remaining in the lake has been increased. Id.
at 429, 658 P.2d at 715, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
18. The court cited the Task Force Report and noted that experimental evidence indicates that
brine shrimp populations decrease as salinity increases. The plaintiffs alleged that in 1981 there was a
95% reduction in the shrimp hatch. Id. at 430, 658 P.2d at 715, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
19. Id.
20. Gull nesting at Mono Lake has declined since coyotes have been able to reach Negrit Island,
formerly the most popular nesting site. Id. at 430, 658 P.2d at 716, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
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in May 1979 to enjoin DWP's diversions on the basis of a bold theory. They
argued that the shores, bed, and waters of Mono Lake were subject to and
protected by a public trust, and that under the trust, the lake's recreational
and ecological values should be protected.21
The action was brought in Mono County, but upon DWP's motion,
venue was changed to Alpine County. DWP cross-complained against over
one hundred individuals claiming rights in Mono Basin, including the
United States. The United States removed the case to the District Court
for the Eastern District of California. Arguing that the two issues to be
resolved were important issues of California law, DWP moved the District
Court to stay its proceedings under the federal abstention doctrine.22 The
District Court did so pending resolution of:
1. A determination of the interrelationship of the public trust doctrine
and the California water rights system.
2. Whether the exhaustion principles generally applied in water rights
cases were applicable to plaintiffs' federal action.23
Seeking resolution of these issues, plaintiffs filed a second action in the
Alpine County Superior Court for declaratory relief. Summary judgment
was entered against the plaintiffs on both issues on November 9, 1981.24
Plaintiffs then filed a Petition for Mandate in the Supreme Court of
California. The Supreme Court issued an alternative Writ and set the case
for argument.2 5 After argument, the Supreme Court of California ordered
the Superior Court of Alpine County to vacate its Judgment and to enter a
new Judgment in conformity with its Opinion.26
21. Id. at 425, 658 P.2d at 712, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
22. The court noted that "[a]bstention is 'now appropriate where there have been presented
difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public impact whose
importance transcends the result in the case then at bar.' "Id. at 432, n. 12,658 P.2d at 717, n. 12, 189
Cal. Rptr. at 353, n. 12, citing Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 801), 814
(1976); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodeaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); and Kaiser Steel
Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968).
23. The scope of this note is limited to the first issue. As to the second issue, the California
Supreme Court reviewed the role of the Water Board, prior public trust doctrine cases, the recent
decisions Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., known as EDF 1, 20 Cal. 3d
327, 572 P.2d 1128, 142 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1977) and EDF 11, 26 Cal. 3d 183, 605 P.2d 1, 161 Cal. Rptr.
446 (1980), and the legislative intent, to hold that although the Board could have provided a remedy for
plaintiffs, the Superior Court had concurrent jurisdiction and it was not therefore necessary for
plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies prior to judicial review. The court recommended
deference to the Board in cases involving issues which required the Board's expertise. This issue is
covered by the court at 33 Cal. 3d at 448-451, 658 P.2d at 729-732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 366-368.
24. Mono Lake, 33 Cal. 3d at 433, 658 P.2d at 717-18, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
25. Id. at 433, 658 P.2d at 718, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
26. Id. at 452-453, 658 P.2d at 732-733, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
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III. THE DECISION
The court carefully considered the California appropriation system
and the state's public trust doctrine in its decision. The court reached its
holding by reconciling the two systems and recognizing the interrelation-
ships which exist between them.
A. The Public Trust Doctrine in California
Recognition of the public trust doctrine is well established in Califor-
nia. In its analysis, the Mono Lake court traced the doctrine's origins to
Roman law and English common law. "[F]rom the earliest days," the
court stated, "judicial decisions have recognized and enforced the trust
obligation. 27 Having recognized the contemporary viability of the doc-
trine, the court carefully examined three aspects of the public trust
doctrine: the purpose, scope, and duties of the state as trustee. 28
The Mono Lake court observed that the purpose of the public trust
doctrine was not limited to traditional uses. "[T] he objective of the public
trust has evolved in tandem with the changing public perception of the
values and uses of waterways. 29 In an earlier decision the court recognized
that the public trust doctrine is not a static, rigid, or inflexible doctrine
limited to the purpose of protecting navigability, commerce, or fisheries. In
Marks v. Whitney, a case concerning tide lands, the court recognized
additional trust purposes and held that the preservation of wild lands for
ecological and aesthetic purposes was "a use encompassed within the tide
lands trust." 30 The Mono Lake court relied on the Marks decision, holding
that the recreational and ecological characteristics of Mono Lake were
similarly protected under the public trust."'
The court next looked at the scope of the public trust doctrine. Since
the city was diverting water from non-navigable tributaries feeding Mono
Lake, the court had to determine to what extent, if any, the public trust
doctrine imposed limitations on the use of non-fiavigable streams which
affects navigable waterways. The court relied on two early cases to hold
that "[t] he Public Trust Doctrine... protects navigable water from harm
caused by diversion of non-navigable tributaries. 32
Both earlier cases provided solid precedent for the Mono Lake court's
holding. People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Company involved an action
by the state against miners who dumped hundreds of cubic yards of sand
27. Id. at 434, 658 P.2d at 718-19, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
28. Id. at 434, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
29. Id. at 434, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
30. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796 (1971).
31. Mono Lake, 33 Cal. 3d at 435, 658 P.2d at 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356.
32. Id. at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
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and gravel into the American River annually.33 The sand and gravel was
carried downstream raising the bed of the Sacramento River and affecting
its navigability. Stating that "[t]he rights of the people in the navigable
rivers of the state are paramount and controlling," the court barred any
further dumping.34 In People v. Russ,35 the second case on which the Mono
Lake court relied, the defendants dammed non-navigable sloughs which
fed into the Salt River. The trial court held for the defendant because of the
non-navigable character of the sloughs. The California Supreme Court,
however, reversed and ordered the trial court to enter a finding which
considered the effect of the dams on the Salt River. Based on these two
early decisions, the Mono Lake court extended the public trust doctrine to
protect Mono Lake from the harmful effects caused by diversion of the
tributaries which supply the lake even though they were non-navigable.
Of the three aspects of the public trust doctrine which the court
examined, the most significant in terms of putting the doctrine on equal
legal ground with the appropriation system was the determination regard-
ing the state's duty as trustee. After reviewing the landmark case of Illinois
Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, which stated that a state cannot
"abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are inter-
ested,"3 " the older California cases of People v. California Fish Co., 7
Boone v. Kingsbury,38 and the recent City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of
Alameda County,39 the court stated:
[T] he public Trust is more than an affirmation of State power to
use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the
duty of the State to protect the people's common heritage of
streams, lakes, marsh lands and tide lands, surrendering that
right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of
that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust.'
On this basis, the court concluded that the state as trustee of the public
trust, "retains continuing supervisory control over its navigable waters and
the lands beneath those waters.""4' The state's continuing fiduciary duty
"prevents any party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate water in a
33. 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152 (1884).
34. Id. at 151-152, 4 P. at 1159.
35. 132 Cal. 102, 64 P. 111 (1901).
36. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
37. 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913). In California Fish Co., the court held that purchasers held
title to tide lands subject to the public interest.
38. 206 Cal. 148, 273 P. 797 (1928). The Boone court held that structures built on leased trust
lands for oil drilling may be removed any time the state subsequently determined that they were
impairing navigability or commerce.
39. 26 Cal.3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980).
40. Mono Lake, 33 Cal. 3d at 441, 658 P.2d at 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360-361.
41. Id. at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
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manner harmful to the interests protected by the public trust. 42
B. The California Water Rights System
In the Mono Lake decision, the court traced the history of the state's
appropriation system to the Water Commission Act of 1913 (Act), and
noted that the Act detailed a statutory procedure for acquiring appropria-
tive rights which subsequently became the exclusive method for obtaining
such rights.43 The court noted that the appropriation system is adminis-
tered by the Board, and that the Board evolved from an agency performing
only ministerial functions such as determining whether water was availa-
ble for appropriation," to an agency presently playing a central role in
resource planning and shaping state policy.
The Board has responsibility to protect the trust res and to consider
trust values in granting appropriations. The Mono Lake court delineated
both a statutory and judicial basis for the Board's trust responsibilities in
the opinion. Under the state water code, "[iun determining the amount of
water available for appropriation, the Board shall take into account,
whenever it is in the public interest, the amount of water needed to remain
in the source for protection of beneficial uses."45 Further, the court noted
that several decisions have established the Board's right to withhold water
from appropriation if it is necessary for the protection of instream uses.46
Thus, the Board which administers the appropriation system has a
statutory and judicial mandate to consider public trust interests.
C. The Interrelationship Between the Public Trust Doctrine and
The California Appropriation System
In Mono Lake, the California appropriative water rights system and
the public trust doctrine met head-on. The plaintiffs alleged that the public
trust was imposed before water rights were appropriated and therefore the
rights protected by the public trust doctrine were thus superior to all other
rights.47 Conversely, the defendants alleged "that the public trust doc-
trine" as to stream waters "has been 'subsumed' into the appropriative
water rights system."'48 The court rejected the notion that either system
was exclusive:
42. Id.
43. Id. at 442,658 P.2d at 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 361. The court notes that the 1923 amendment
to the Act established the exclusive procedure for obtaining appropriative rights. Id.
44. Id. 3d at 444, 658 P.2d at 726, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
45. Id. at 445, 658 P.2d at 726, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
46. Id. 3d at 444, 658 P.2d at 726, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363. See CALIFORNIA WATER CODE §
1243.5 (West 1971).
47. 33 Cal. 3d at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
48. Id. at 445, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363-364.
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[B]oth the public trust doctrine and the water rights system
embody important precepts which make the law more responsive
to the diverse needs and interests involved in the planning and
allocation of water resources. To embrace one system of thought
and reject the other would lead to an unbalanced structure, one
which would either decry as a breach of trust appropriations
essential to the economic development of the state, or deny any
duty to protect or even consider the values promoted by the public
trust.4 9
Recognizing that a balance between the two systems was essential the
court reached three major conclusions calculated to accommodate both
systems:
1. The State retains continuing supervisory control over its naviga-
ble water.50
2. The Water Board can grant appropriative rights which are
subject to the public trust but that "may unavoidably harm, the trust uses
at the source stream. 51
3. "The State has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into
account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and protect
public trust uses whenever feasible." '52
IV. THE IMPACT
The appropriation system followed in most western states has been
fashioned to serve the immediate and pragmatic needs of growing
populations and industry in arid climates. The system has worked well.
Before statehood it allowed for the growth of agriculture and mining.
Today it continues to serve the needs of additional industrial and domestic
users and promote the economies of these states. At the same time that
states' appropriative water rights systems were evolving, however, courts
were recognizing the states' obligation to protect waters for the public
under the public trust doctrine. By refusing to hold that the two principles
of water law are mutually exclusive, or that one is legally superior to the
other, the California court has firmly established, at least where navigable
water may be affected, that an individual or entity may not acquire an
absolute right in that water. Such waters may be available to appropriative
use but in turn come burdened with the trust obligation. The court's
recognition of the continuing fiduciary duty of the state underscores the
usufructary nature of the right.
49. Id., 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 446, 658 P.2d at 727, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
52. Id. at 446, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
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At first glance it appears that the California court has undermined the
security of appropriative rights and that difficulties may arise as a result. In
a broader sense, however, the court has increased the stability of Califor-
nia's water rights system. By mandating consideration of trust values, the
court has offset purely economic concerns and forced a balance which may
ultimately enhance the perpetuation of the water resource, and other
resources as well.
This decision has been referred to as the most significant public trust
case since Illinois Central.53 The court limited the reach of the decision,
however, when it, like previous courts, linked public trust protection with
navigability. 54 Recently Montana took a step beyond this landmark case
when it rejected the navigability notion in applying the public trust
doctrine and instead applied a much broader test effectively providing
public trust protection to nearly all of the state's waters. 55
Relying on its constitution and the common law public trust doctrine,
the Montana court established that the public's right of recreational use
should be limited only by the capabilities of the water and not by streambed
ownership or navigability.56
The holdings in the Montana cases were directed at facts involving
recreational boaters and the court was not directly faced with the fish and
wildlife, aesthetic and ecological concerns which the Mono Lake court
considered. But the Montana court used the term "recreational use", and
arguably the public's interest in fish, wildlife, aesthetic and ecological
values would be subsumed by that broad category. The court's reasoning
that the state constitution imposed no limits on public use of water suggests
that this would be a logical extension.
These decisions by the Montana court parallel the result reached by
the California court in abandoning the rigid, traditional classification of
trust purposes and extending public trust protection to the "non-tradi-
53. Professor Al Stone made the observation in a Water Law class at the University of Montana
School of Law on April 24, 1985.
54. In examining the scope of the public trust doctrine, the navigability of Mono Lake was
central to the court's analysis. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
55. The two recent cases are Montana Coalition for Stream Access, - Mont._ 682 P.2d
163 (1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth, - Mont.___, 684 P.2d 1088
(1984). Discussed more fully in Thorson, Brown and Desmond, Forging Public Rights in Montana's
Waters, PUB. LAND L. REV. (1985). See Curran, - Mont. at _ 682 P.2d at 170, for the court's
conclusion that water characteristics determine the availabilityof the water for public recreational use.
56. The Montana Constitution provides in Art. IX Section 3(3) that:
All surface, underground, flood and atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state
are the property of the state for the use of its people and are subject to appropriation for
beneficial uses as provided by law."
The court found no constitutional limit on the public's right to use water for recreation. Curran,
Mont. at - 658 P.2d at 170.
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tional" recreational use. Further, by severing the navigability require-
ment, Montana has clearly gone beyond California in expanding the scope
of the doctrine.
The Montana court neatly sidestepped the issue arising from the
inevitable conflict between the public trust doctrine and the state's
appropriative water rights system by stating in Curran that its holding
applied only to the state's unappropriated water.57 However, with the
development of the doctrine in the state and the court's demonstrated
willingness to rely on the state constitution as well as the common law to
find a trust obligation, the Montana court has an even stronger foundation
than the Mono Lake court for holding that the state has a continuing
fiduciary duty to protect the trust res. If the court eventually recognizes
that duty, Montana recreationists, including those with wildlife or aes-
thetic concerns, may also demand consideration of trust values for
appropriated water.
V. CONCLUSION
The Mono Lake case established a basis for reasoned resource
allocation in the face of significant and competing economic and ecological
concerns from which other western states can benefit. The decision does not
insure that Mono Lake will retain its ecological viability or that Los
Angeles will have a continuous and adequate supply of fresh water. It does,
however, insure that at least before either of those eventualities occur, the
costs will be considered and understood, and a balance struck.
In light of Curran and Hildreth, the Montana court will likely be
confronted with the task of balancing competitive claims to Montana's
waters. In striking the balance, the court would be wise to integrate the
Mono Lake reasoning into its holding.
57. The court concluded that defendant Curran had, "no right to control the use of the surface
waters of the Dearborn to the exclusion of the public except to the extent of his prior appropriation of
part of the water for irrigation purposes, which is not at issue here." Curran,__ Mont. at , 682
P.2d at 170.
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